
Human Rights edition Prague Watchdog (Part 1, Part 2) published an interview with the head of the Informational-Analytical Service of the Caucasus Emirate Movladi Udugovym. Kavkaz Center publishes the text of that interview.
Prague Watchdog: In the pages of the Kavkaz Center web site you recently quoted a Chechen proverb which says "A man is not one who knows how to fight, but one who knows who his enemies are," or words to that effect. Let's start with a list of your enemies.
Movladi Udugov: My personal enemies?
PW: We can make a distinction between them. First, let's say, your personal enemies, then your enemies as a Muslim.
MU: I see. I want to make it clear that this quotation is borrowed from Shamil [Basayev]. After his death an article was published where it said that he liked to repeat that saying. Regarding enemies: where personal ones are concerned, each of us knows very well who his enemy is, and our enemies know whether we are their enemy or not. So I shall leave my personal enemies out of it - we must deal with them ourselves.
As for the concepts of "enemy" and "enmity" - if we are to judge them in terms of politics, inter-state relations or ideological struggle, then one doesn't need to spend too much time philosophizing. It's all in the palm of one's hand. There is powerful opposition at a global level, and we have no shortage of enemies, but we are divided.
Naturally, the main enemy is Russia, Moscow, the Russian state, the empire, which for several centuries now has been trying every fifty years or so to destroy the Chechen people and the Muslims of the North Caucasus. And it's not just the Caucasus.
People in all the Muslim-inhabited territories that were conquered by Russia are periodically subjected to genocide. So if we are to speak of the adversary as the source of a threat that involves violence, enemy number one is, as I said, Russia. With this enemy we are at war. There are casualties on both sides. And I don't think it will really be possible to solve this problem at a political level, as many would like. Aggression is inherent to Russia, and Russia will go on attacking us and trying to kill us for as long as it has the strength to do so.
PW: If the problem can't be solved by political means, does that mean that one of the parties to the conflict must simply vanish from the face of the earth, be destroyed? Either the Chechens or the Russians?
MU: Wiping things from the face of the earth is not the prerogative of any nation, state, group of persons or person. It is the prerogative of the Almighty. He disposes of the destinies of nations and decides whom to destroy, and whom to leave. That problem does not cause us concern.
Another point along the way is to reflect on the prospects of coexistence with the enemy. There are many factors involved. But if we are to talk in terms of one side being bound to lose or, conversely, achieving victory, one often recalls the saying: "All wars end in negotiations." Yes, indeed, sooner or later negotiations are inevitable, but of the two contracting parties one is certain to be the loser. Or military action may cease because both sides run out of strength and resources and find it unprofitable to continue the conflict.
So to present the matter in terms of one side being bound to destroy the other is the wrong approach. It would be more correct to say that one of the adversaries must either grow weaker or stronger. And then you get a situation where one side finds it unprofitable to wage war, while the other remains active and continues to exert pressure. The balance of force may be established in such a way that our enemy will be compelled to offer us peace and negotiations. In that case we shall see how far the proposed conditions correspond to our interests, the goals for which we are now fighting. We don't just keep fighting for fighting's sake, after all. This war must undermine Russia's power, depriving her of the ability to commit another aggression in the future. That is the main thing.
PW: In the Koran, Allah says: "And fight them until there is no more persecution, and (all) religion belongs to Allah." The problem is that the Emirate doesn't simply base its priorities in the need to defend the Chechens and Muslims of the Caucasus and secure decent living conditions for them, but also in the establishment of the true faith. So if he is an unbeliever, must the enemy either be converted or destroyed?
MU: It's not at all as easy as the question suggests. Today we are fighting a war with a specific enemy which is trying to kill us. He came to our land and occupied us. He is trying to foist his ways customs on us, impose his law. Today we are resisting the enemy. And what will our next steps be? All the steps, the actions, the logic are clearly stated in Sharia. In Islamic law there are precedents for defining the principles of coexistence with unbelievers. In his day the Prophet in his day concluded a treaty with the kufr, as is stated in the Koran. He concluded a truce.
The question is not one of declaring war on the whole world. We must first solve the problem of how to survive. But if we start broaching questions of global confrontation, we shall go far astray from our theme. We are talking specifically about the Caucasus Emirate which was proclaimed on 25th Ramadan last autumn.
PW: We should have phrased it more precisely. Does the reference to the practice of the Prophet mean that you will tolerate peaceful relations with the infidels and the possibility of living in conflict-free coexistence with them?
MU: Of course. There are many such moments in the history of Islam. In the places where the authority of the Muslims was established there was no coercion in religion, as the Koran states. There are fixed conditions for the spreading of Islam and relations with the countries of the kufr.
But if we are talking about our struggle, I can say that today the Muslims of the Caucasus are moving from a strategy of defence towards a strategy of war. That is quite a different approach. And in this context, I don't think that the war will stop for as long as Russia continues to have even the slightest opportunity of committing aggression.
PW: It doesn't really matter how you assess the reasons, but because of either error or ignorance a considerable number of North Caucasus Muslims profess what is called traditional Islam, i.e. the kind of Islam that has incorporated pre-Islamic customs and beliefs. These people consider themselves citizens of Russia as a secular state, and are quite satisfied with the existing order and way of life. They are totally unwilling to live by the law which do you consider mandatory for all true believers. What is to be done with these people?
MU: The formulation of the question is not correct. Russia came to a territory where people lived according to Islam, the true law. There was Sharia. The Russians came and killed, robbed, raped, destroyed millions of people, entire nations, in order to impose their authority ...
PW: Stop, stop! Can we pause for a moment? There are not a few episodes in history where some nations conquered others. And, nations in general must have quite a few claims on one another. Two hundred, three hundred or even two thousand years ago, someone took something from someone, someone was killed, wars of conquest were fought, territory repeatedly changed hands. Must we now return to the conditions, customs and boundaries that prevailed in the kingdom of Urartu, or before?
MU: I will explain my position once again. First, for nations to understand what they really want, they have to be free.
PW: A referendum, Movladi?
MU: No, not a referendum. I wish you wouldn't keep interrupting me. Once again I repeat: in order to understand what nations want, and to ensure that they have a precise grasp of the principles they want to live by, they need to achieve political independence. Today, these nations and their territories are occupied. So in order to conceive how events will unfold, how life in the North Caucasus will change, the Islamic lands must first of all be freed from occupation.
With regard to the question "What is to be done with these people?" - first, let me remind you once again: in Islam there is no compulsion in matters of religion. A second point: the question of whether the type of Islam that's observed is traditional or not, of what version of Islam is followed - this is not a problem of Islam itself. It's a problem of political power and occupation.
When people receive education they will see the real nature of Islam, which must be accepted and by which it is essential to live. No one is going to drive anyone into the mosques by force.
PW: And who will offer the education and watch to see that it meets all the requirements of true faith?
MU: Seventy years of Soviet rule and the subsequent years of democratic Russia have most tragically affected the Muslim consciousness. Attempts were made to destroy it every day, and this, of course, led to the most lamentable results.
Today, the Caucasus has a huge number of non-Muslims. They are Muslims by birth, but they don't adhere to any of the tenets of Islam in their lives, and they don't even try to. And it's not that people don't want to accept Islam, but that their territories are occupied by an alien political system. They can't obtain a true picture of Islam.
Today in Russia an unfortunate publisher was brought before a court for publishing a book called The Muslim Identity. I would not even call this absurd. It's a natural process, a demonstration of the fact that Muslims are deprived of any possibility of practising their religion under the rule of the occupier.
In Russia today there is a natural process that involves the strengthening of colonial tendencies and the spread of a colonial war against Islam.
Islam is primarily an ideology. Two ideologies can never get along peacefully on the same territory, not matter how much we would want them to. Today in Moscow that is well understood and known. There they see that a man who seems to be reading a harmless book about Muslim identity which describes the moral qualities of the believer - how he should arrange his relations with his parents and family, how he should behave towards other people - such a man is, by his very nature, becoming a danger to the authorities.
And the proposal to take current reality as a basis for the future is in itself dishonest. To come and seize one's land and then say: "Well, what can you do now, that's just how it is!" That is wrong. First we'll restore what was de facto smashed, destroyed, corrupted, and then we will ask questions like what shall we do and how.
PW: All right, let's switch to the subjunctive mood. Let's suppose that everything has been restored, and that Islamic education is widely practised. What if a significant number of people refuse to follow the norms of the true faith? Is it possible to coerce them into the true faith? After all, Sharia prescribes coercion of that kind.
MU: Every country has its laws, its Constitution, established norms of behaviour, a system. Now the people who don't want to observe the laws of a particular state don't need to live in it - they can go away and live in another country. And those who want to live in this country must simply obey its laws. That is all.
PW: But in most modern countries the laws are established by democratic procedures. They've been discussed, accepted, the nation itself has shaped the conditions for its own existence by various means. With you, the principle is totally different: the law is established from above, and its source is considered to be Allah.
MU: Absolutely true.
PW: So there is no provision for democratic procedures. Today's law for the North Caucasian peoples was worked out in the forest and the mountains. Let's suppose that, as a result of your victory, it's established in all the territories of the region. All those who don't want to obey it will have to be coerced into doing so, or else emigrate. Is that correct?
MU: The question is understandable. For the nations of Europe, the "correct" procedure involves consulting the population, holding referendums or parliamentary elections. And Parliament must sit and devise some laws. For us Muslims, that position is totally absurd. We say that human beings are not capable of devising a just law. We believe that the law has been sent down to earth by the Almighty, by God. Nations, politicians and parliaments have no right to devise laws. The law is given by our Creator. For us the position of the democratic European societies is criminal and absurd, because you have falsely claimed for yourselves the prerogative of devising laws for human beings. You are trying to remove this prerogative from the Creator, who gave birth to the nations, settled them on the land, gave them laws and explained those laws to them with the help of the Prophets.
Today the democratic countries have launched a new world war. They are attacking the Muslims in order to impose on them the laws of democracy, to impose the ways and customs they themselves have devised. We say: "We don't want that, leave us alone!" But they don't leave us, and they don't leave us alone.
The question is put this way: "Some people don't want to." Well, if they don't, so what? We - who are a part of the people, a part of the population, a part of the nations of the Caucasus - have taken up arms to establish those laws which are natural for this territory.
PW: Let's move on to military affairs. The second war has been going on since 1999, and yet there don't seem to be any grounds for saying that either the Chechen resistance or, after it, the Caucasus Emirate have achieved any major success. For many years now the leaders of the underground have been indefatigable in their claims that the Muslims of the entire Caucasus are rising up with weapons in their hands. Yet in reality the tactical parameters that have emerged suggest that the underground is weak, and there certainly don't seem to be any real prospects for a victorious march of true Muslims through the North Caucasus.
MU: We have different appraisals of what has happened and what is happening just now. You see no distinction between the various periods of armed struggle. But we, on the other hand, assess the situation in quite a different way.
I agree that at one time there was an emphasis on the military and tactical side of the issue. There was no clear strategy. When in 1991 we proclaimed the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, it was possible to glimpse elements of a strategy, however blurred, and everyone knew what direction we had to move in.
It goes without saying that freedom, independence, political independence and sovereignty are a very important moral boost for a nation, a people, and those who feel themselves to be part of it. The self-esteem of an ethnic group is based on this. But the situation has begun to change rapidly, both in Chechnya and in the world at large. In the place of those who with absolute sincerity went to fight under the slogan of national liberation there has come a new generation of young people who believe in the promise of Allah and the saving force of jihad. In other words, independence has ceased to be something abstract. Previously, it was seen as the sole and ultimate goal. But independence is only one of the conditions for the victory of truth. The new generation of mojahedin has gone to war not for the sake of independence and freedom alone, but first and foremost in order to restore Sharia law to the liberated lands.
It's not just the ideology that has changed - the people who were willing to sacrifice their lives have begun to interpret the world quite differently. The new generation of mojahedin has moved away from the perception of ethnicity as an absolute value, and has turned to God. As a result, a very serious contradiction has developed on our side. Some of those who took part in the war, who fought for independence and grew mortally weary from all the years of tension, have seen some sort of prospects for themselves on the other side. They have found an explanation for their betrayal, declaring that it may be possible to get at least part of the way towards the ideal of national independence under the banners of Kadyrov. Though the facts suggest this may be an illusion, merely making a move in a chosen direction has become their excuse. They have laid down their arms and have either gone over to the side of the enemy, left the country, or have given up the struggle and just aimed at surviving the bad times.
That is precisely why the fighting generation has more or less changed completely, one hundred per cent. That is where the crisis erupted, because the new situation came into conflict with decrepit ideas and political and ideological structures which were only propped up by the force of inertia. I refer to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, its parliament, its president - all of its formal accessories. In this, a great danger lurked - the attempt to preserve a hybrid of old and new could have resulted in a real disaster. If military action on our side was still to be led by people who knew no truths other than Ichkerian independence, democracy, and international law, then a very powerful rupture could have occurred between them and the young people who had come out to die for Allah. The warring side might have collapsed into small, totally ungovernable groups that had no future at all.
After the death of Maskhadov, when the armed struggle was headed by the educated religious leader Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, the sense of danger became more pronounced. So much depends on the leader. Our leaders - those who waged jihad - have done tremendous work. Shamil Basayev played an enormous role in uniting the Muslims. In 2003, 2004 and 2005 he visited all the regions of the Caucasus - from the Caspian to the Black Sea. That was a titanic manoeuvre.
When in 2006 the leaders of the jihad finally understood that the changes were irreversible, documents were drawn up which formed the seedbed of a new strategy. And almost immediately after the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate last summer, the military and tactical situation began to change.
For the first time there was the activation of a fundamentally different set of military-tactical techniques specially adapted for the new strategy. This was the result of a huge amount of work and effort that had spanned many years. The military tactical picture will eventually be completely updated, though the full effects of that will not be visible this year. But we hope that sooner or later our efforts will produce results and that the accumulated potential will manifest itself in an explosive manner. It will lead to some very serious political, military and territorial changes.
PW: And what are the strategic objectives that have been set? Why do they possess the kind of strength that can provide significant tactical successes?
MU: In the first place, the leaders of the jihad, the mojahedin, have identified themselves by their goal and their flag. These are not merely symbols we have chosen - they are the driving belts of our struggle. They mobilize more and more forces, they provide motivation, and they indicate the precise direction of our movement.
PW: By "goal and flag" you mean the introduction of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus?
MU: Of course. And, as Dokka Umarov very accurately observed, this Islamic state does not yet have any borders. It's not correct to say that we want to build some sort of enclave on the territory of these North Caucasus republics. No, today many Muslims living in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Russians from the most widely differing regions of Russia who have accepted Islam, swear an oath of allegiance to Dokka Umarov as the legitimate leader of the Muslims. And wherever he is - in Moscow, Blagoveshchensk, Tyumen, Vladivostok - when a Muslim swears that oath, he becomes a fighting unit. Just because these people are not visible in their cities just now and are not active, that doesn't mean that they won't become active in the future.
PW: So when the Emirate's leadership deems fit, it will sooner or later set them specific military objectives?
MU: And the Russian authorities are perfectly aware of this. Therefore they try to use pre-emptive methods, preventive strikes to localize the situation. I may be wrong, but I have given it a lot of thought, have analyzed it thoroughly, and it seems to me that the processes that are underway not only the Caucasus but also around the world at a global level, put the Kremlin in the position of a chess-player forced into the so-called "zugzwang" situation, where any move means to lose the game.
They can use repression, they can ban the most innocuous Islamic literature, but by doing so they demonstrate their weakness and uncertainty, their lack of any understanding of how to act in the evolving circumstances.
It's not a strategically adjusted sequence of steps, but rather a panic reaction, an instinctive fear of danger that pushes them into cruel and unwise actions which only increase the number of our supporters.
PW: This summer there have been more attacks and raids on villages than there were last year. Yet all of these developments remain within the limits of traditional tactics, and even though there are more of them, their quality is much as before. All the operations are planned along the same lines that have been adopted ever since the first war. Will new formats be developed?
MU: I think the question reflects a rather superficial approach. What is happening today is very different from the situation last year. There were similar operations in previous years: the events in Argun, the Nazran operation. But the current parameters of the fighting have changed completely.
Today the fighters go into the villages - there's a different attitude between them and the villagers, and it works both ways. The fighters themselves are in a different position. Today when the mojahedin go into a village, they destroy the occupiers or their collaborators, but at the same time they carry out very serious ideological work with the local population. Nowadays they don't just arrive, strike, put the enemy to rout and withdraw. The fighters who enter a village and maintain permanent contact with the local residents require them to observe Sharia law.
PW: How can that lead to any tactical military victories?
MU: It's only the tip of an inner iceberg. I can't talk now about all the changes. But I can describe the situation that has developed in the mountains of Chechnya.
On a ridge sit the Russians, below a village. A detachment of fighters enters the village under the eyes of the Russian troops who are keeping it under complete control, turns round and then leaves the place again in an orderly column, right under the Russians' noses. And the Russians don't shoot. Why? For the very simple reason which they quite unashamedly mention in their secret talks with the mohajedin. They say: "If you don't touch us, we won't touch you".
The internals of the situation are changing. There are a great many points which I can't state openly. Our main strategy update took place last summer. There aren't yet that many changes in tactics, and they're not even very noticeable on the outside.
PW: Is there any hope that with Medvedev's arrival the situation will improve?
MU: The Russians have a saying: "Horseradish is no sweeter than ordinary radish". It's irrelevant who is going to be there in the Kremlin - Medvedev, Putin or whoever. In order to understand our position and how we see things, one needs to have an Islamic view of the world.
PW: In military and tactical terms that probably means that successful combat operations by the mojahedin must sooner or later force Russia to the negotiating table?
MU: That is only a part of what the Muslims have in mind.
PW: When will victory come?
MU: I don't know. When Allah wills it - that's when he'll grant us victory.
PW: And when would you like to win it? Yesterday?
MU: Islamic scholars say that Allah grants the Muslims the conditions for victory once every hundred years. In this century we should like to take advantage of those conditions. We shall try to make it happen in our lifetime.
Department of Monitoring,
Kavkaz Center